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First released in the UK in 1983, this handsome reprint is a welcome 
addition that once again provides easy access to West’s detailed look at the 
origins of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) known as MI6.  West 
has been a highly respected though sometimes controversial figure in the 
Intelligence field for many years.  One might even say the controversies 
begin with the fact that there is no “Nigel West.”  Instead, it is the pen 
name of Britain’s former Conservative Party Member of Parliament Rupert 
Allason.  Nonetheless, under his nom de plume West has authored an 
incredible selection of historical books on intelligence agencies and 
operations over the last forty years, and those works have marked him as a 
tenacious researcher and noted expert in the field. 
 
West’s MI6 is a useful companion to his previously published work on 
MI5.  Together the books give readers insight not only into the 
administrative processes that led to the creation of those agencies, but also 
to MI6’s many failures and the inter-agency conflicts, along with the less 
frequent triumphs, that marked the early years.  Less apparent in the MI6 
volume is a full discussion of actual operations.  Details are often 
necessarily sacrificed in the interest of focusing more how cases affected 
the growth and development of the agency.  Selected influential cases do 
receive more complete examination.  This is not a significant flaw; other 
authors have detailed a number of those cases in books more specifically 
dedicated to operational activities, and West himself has explored several 
of them in his own succeeding works. 
 
MI6 is divided into two main parts. The first covers the period 1903-1940, 
and the second covers from 1940-1945.  Part one includes chapters on the 
earliest years of the service, which was thrust into the First World War 
within a few years of its creation after focusing almost exclusively on 
Russia, not Germany.  During that conflict SIS was often sidelined or 
overshadowed by the older and more maturely competent Naval 
Intelligence Division.  Chapters focused on each of the service’s leaders: 
Mansfield Cumming, Hugh Sinclair, and Stewart Menzies inform readers 
of the service’s growth and struggles as well as the roles those leaders 
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played in shaping the focus and direction of the operations that would 
eventually prove the worth of SIS and bring it into its own.  One early 
mistake West suggests, however, might have been the use of Passport 
Control Offices (PCO) as the primary cover for SIS operatives.  This served 
to increase tensions between SIS and the Foreign Office and led to a host 
of other issues.  Once it became known, for example, that Passport Control 
was a cover for intelligence officers—a reality the Germans figured out 
pretty quickly—it became an easy matter to identify those intelligence 
officers simply by walking into the office and applying for a visa.  In fact, 
visa applications sometimes took up such a substantial portion of the 
PCO’s time that intelligence work had to take a back seat.  This became a 
particular problem when an increasing number of applications were made 
by those seeking to flee the rising threat of Nazi rule in Europe. 
 
In addition to the PCOs, Sinclair had also established a totally separate 
network of agents operating under commercial cover known simply as Z.  
One of the Z agents, in the midst of Menzies’ later efforts to combine the 
two networks, was involved in SIS’ greatest pre-war misstep in the fall of 
1939.  The so-called Venlo incident involved two senior SIS officers in The 
Hague who thought they had arranged with much clandestine effort and 
negotiation to meet a highly placed, anti-Nazi Wehrmacht general whom 
they intended to spirit to London for secret talks about a possible coup and 
the arrest of Hitler.  Instead the two agents found themselves suddenly 
kidnapped near Venlo on the German-Dutch border in what turned out to 
be an elaborate Nazi Security Service scheme that completely 
compromised SIS’s already shaky order of battle.  An appendix in the book 
provides the actual Abwehr synopsis of debriefs of the two kidnapped 
agents and shows how fully the organization was compromised.  Such 
incidents along with the generally poor quality of intelligence provided by 
SIS over the years weakened its reputation in Whitehall, so much so that 
when the first ULTRA decrypts were later circulated they were largely 
ignored because of the distrust resulting from the accumulated 
disappointment with SIS’s previous information.  Fortunately for MI6, the 
decryption work at Bletchley soon proved its value, and West speculates 
that had those efforts not been so critical to the war effort it’s possible 
“neither Menzies nor his organization could have survived” (263).  
Instead, by the end of the Second World War MI6 had ascended to its 
zenith.  Kim Philby and his associates in the Cambridge Five would bring 
the agency down several pegs once more after that. 
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Part two is mostly broken into chapters addressing operations in various 
locations throughout Europe and the Middle East.  It is about a third 
longer than part one even though it covers only the five years of war, 
during which SIS was largely compelled to obtain much of its information 
in exchange for the support it provided to networks run by governments 
exiled from the Continent.  SIS’s structure was skeletal after Hitler’s troops 
had marched over most of Europe, and though its training and support for 
the exiled governments’ networks was important, SIGINT eventually 
would constitute its saving grace.  Unlike World War I, where the Germans 
had severely restricted their use of battlefield wireless communications, 
the Enigma machines of World War II provided the Nazis with the 
confidence to greatly increase radio traffic.   It proved at first to be an 
embarrassment of riches to SIS.  Staff levels, equipment, and processes 
were too immature to handle the influx of raw intelligence, and that flaw 
took time to address effectively.  In addition, MI6’s credibility issues and 
its lackluster performance in comparison to MI5’s successes meant the 
war’s early years were still a struggle. 
 
If SIS operations seemed apprentice-like at times, failures were often 
compounded by the brave yet frequently naïve actions of the stay-behind 
intelligence networks on the Continent.  Many were filled with volunteers 
wholly untrained in intelligence operations, and the networks were 
sometimes riddled with informants.  One illustrative example is that of the 
French INTERALLIE network led by a Polish operative codenamed 
VALENTIN, which proved highly successful at first.  Eventually the 
network was dismantled when a disgruntled cipher clerk and one of 
INTERALLIE’s sector leaders betrayed the organization.  Within three 
days the network’s entire staff had been arrested.  The cipher clerk agreed 
to inform SIS that VALENTIN had been arrested and that she would be 
taking over the network herself.  VICTOIRE thus replaced VALENTIN, 
and she continued to supply info to SIS using the network’s radio sets now 
controlled by the Abwehr.  As a result, SIS even connected VICTOIRE with 
operatives from Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE).  The result 
was the immediate interception of two SOE agents landed on the coast.  
Once the duplicity was discovered SIS had only to benefit from the hard 
lessons learned about lax security procedures and insufficient 
compartmentalization, the negative results of which were only 
compounded by innocently bringing SOE into the mess. 
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The record was not all one of failure however, and among other successes 
SIS neutralized NAZI efforts to establish two infra-red detectors placed on 
opposite coasts near the Straits of Gibraltar that would have seriously 
hindered Allied passage through that area and jeopardized the landings in 
North Africa.  The detector system on the coast near Tangiers was blown 
into the sea by SIS agents, which caused the then useless matching system 
in Spain to be abandoned. 
 
One particularly interesting chapter is devoted to the role of the American 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS).  MI6 had enough problems of its own, 
but those were compounded by the sudden insertion of the cousins’ 
amateurish efforts into the mix.  Disagreements over operational methods 
or whom to employ as operatives even led to instances of SIS obstructing 
OSS operations.   An OSS focus on short-term gains unfortunately led the 
agency to rely on and support a number of leftist organizations, which 
ended up being politically well placed and able to influence Allied policies 
in the post-war era. 
 
One complaint about the book is the paucity of notes (fifteen in all) and 
the absence of a bibliography.  That flaw certainly limits the book’s 
usefulness to researchers, but for a general overview of the founding of 
MI6 and a glimpse at some select operations, it’s perfectly adequate and 
definitely worth reading. 
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